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Abstract
The use of dialogue systems as a medium for human-machine
interaction is an increasingly prevalent paradigm. A grow-
ing number of dialogue systems use conversation strategies
that are learned from large datasets. There are well docu-
mented instances where interactions with these system have
resulted in biased or even offensive conversations due to the
data-driven training process. Here, we highlight potential eth-
ical issues that arise in dialogue systems research, including:
implicit biases in data-driven systems, the rise of adversar-
ial examples, potential sources of privacy violations, safety
concerns, special considerations for reinforcement learning
systems, and reproducibility concerns. We also suggest areas
stemming from these issues that deserve further investigation.
Through this initial survey, we hope to spur research leading
to robust, safe, and ethically sound dialogue systems.
Introduction
Dialogue systems – often referred to as conversational
agents, chatbots, etc. – provide convenient human-machine
interfaces and have become increasingly prevalent with the
advent of virtual personal assistants. The hands-free interac-
tion mechanism provided by these systems is crucial for use
in certain critical settings (e.g. in cars or for persons with
mobility impairments). However, the subjective nature of di-
alogue (Curry, Hastie, and Rieser 2017; Liu et al. 2016), and
the onset of data-driven components (Vinyals and Le 2015;
Serban et al. 2017c), leads to several potential dangers with
the widespread use of these systems.
Ethics and safety in artificial intelligence (AI) has re-
cently gained popularity as a field due to performance gains
in AI models, investigating issues like: interpretability of
model decisions (Kim 2015), worst-case performance guar-
antees (Garcıa and Ferna´ndez 2015), and many others. In
the context of dialogue systems, issues of safety and ethics
are no less important, yet they are rarely discussed in the
literature or in practice. As dialogue systems become more
prevalent and trusted, it is vital to develop systems that ac-
count for possible ethical and safety concerns.
Here, we investigate several crucial aspects of ethics and
safety in dialogue systems, which reflect modern state-of-
the-art research in the field: bias, adversarial examples, pri-
vacy in learned models, safety, special considerations for re-
inforcement learning systems, and reproducibility. To high-
light these issues, we: investigate possible areas of concern
in the literature; conduct new experiments to shed light on
potential problems in existing datasets, models, and algo-
rithms; provide initial recommendations based on current
methodologies; propose possible future lines of investiga-
tion in relation to dialogue systems.1 While we limit the
scope of this paper to ethical considerations that are relevant
for developers of data-driven dialogue systems, we briefly
touch on social issues related to the deliberate misuse of
these systems. We aim to spur discussions and drive future
research directions for the development of safe and ethical
dialogue systems.
Background: Dialogue Systems
The standard architecture for dialogue systems incorpo-
rates a Speech Recognizer, Language Interpreter, State
Tracker, Response Generator, Natural Language Generator,
and Speech Synthesizer. In the case of text-based (writ-
ten) dialogues, as we focus on here, the Speech Recog-
nizer and Speech Synthesizer can be left out. Much of the
recent literature has favoured end-to-end data-driven ap-
proaches to building dialogue systems (Vinyals and Le 2015;
Li et al. 2016; Serban et al. 2017a). An end-to-end data-
driven dialogue system is a single system that can be used
to solve each of the four aforementioned modules simulta-
neously. Typically this is a system that takes as input the
history of the conversation and is trained to optimize a sin-
gle objective, which is a function of the textual output pro-
duced by the system and the correct (ground truth) response.
Since these systems are often trained on very large dialogue
corpora, it becomes easy for subtle biases in the data to be
learned and imitated by the models.
Dialogue systems have been built for a wide range of
purposes. A useful distinction can be made between task-
oriented dialogue systems, such as technical support ser-
vices, and non-task-oriented dialogue systems (i.e. chat-
bots), such as computer game characters. Although both
types of systems do in fact have objectives, typically the
task-oriented dialogue systems have a well-defined measure
of performance that is explicitly related to task completion
for the user. Ethical issues must be taken under consideration
1Supplemental material referred to throughout the text is at:
https://github.com/Breakend/EthicsInDialogue
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for both task-oriented and non-task-oriented systems; the de-
tails of these considerations may differ slightly for each, yet
the core notions we discuss remain relevant to both. Thus,
while the experiments in this paper are performed on non-
task-oriented systems, much of our discussion also applies
to task-oriented systems.
Bias
Bias can be defined as prejudice for or against a person,
group, idea, or thing – particularly expressed in an unfair
way. Bias is a broad term, which covers a range of prob-
lems particularly relevant in natural language systems in-
cluding: predispositions for regional speech patterns (Fine et
al. 2014), discriminatory gender bias (Bolukbasi et al. 2016),
personal point-of-view bias (Recasens, Danescu-Niculescu-
Mizil, and Jurafsky 2013), and numerous others. These bi-
ases can be expressed subtly (e.g. with linguistic cues indi-
cating a point-of-view) or blatantly (e.g. as in discriminatory
statements against a gender). Due to their subjective nature
and goal of mimicking human behaviour, dialogue models
are susceptible to implicitly encode underlying biases in hu-
man dialogue.
While this is a potential factor in rule-based systems –
encoding the biases of the rule-makers – it is particularly
problematic for data-driven systems, such as neural conver-
sational models. In modern research, the data used to train
these models is often obtained from online chat platforms
(Reddit, WeChat, Twitter, etc.) (Serban et al. 2015). These
datasets are difficult to hand-filter and may include under-
lying biases (Henry and Tator 2002) or even subtle agenda
setting campaigns (Tsur, Calacci, and Lazer 2015).
It has been shown that these biases can be encoded in lan-
guage models (Bolukbasi et al. 2016) and live dialogue sys-
tems (Neff and Nagy 2016). In one such case, the Microsoft
Tay Chatbot was taken offline after posting messages with
blatant racial slurs, as described in the phenomenological
study in (Neff and Nagy 2016). These slurs and racial bi-
ases had been present in the content Tay was trained on. As
a result, it encoded and then propagated these biases through
interactions with users.
. Dialogue Datasets To determine the exposure of con-
versational models to underlying dataset bias, we analyze
the extent of various biases in several commonly used di-
alogue datasets. We leverage the linguistic bias detection
framework of (Hutto, Folds, and Appling 2015) and the hate
speech and offensive language detection model of (David-
son et al. 2017) to gather bias metrics on several popular
dialogue datasets: Twitter (Ritter, Cherry, and Dolan 2010),
Reddit Politics (Serban et al. 2017b), the Cornell Movie Dia-
logue Corpus (Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil and Lee 2011), and
the Ubuntu Dialogue Corpus (Lowe et al. 2015).
As seen in Table 1, none of these datasets are free of bias,
hate speech, or offensive language. Qualitative samples for
each of these models can be found in the supplemental ma-
terial. In models which do not explicitly prevent the uptake
of such content, it can be expected that these behaviours
will be encoded in the underlying model. To this end, we
run another experiment. We train two commonly used end-
to-end dialogue models, HRED (Serban et al. 2016) and
VHRED (Serban et al. 2017c), on the Twitter dataset and
sample responses using contexts from the validation set. As
seen in Table 1, we find that samples from these models also
encode bias according to the previously defined metrics.
Overall, we rely on the models of bias and discriminatory
language to analyze these datasets. We find that these models
seem to perform relatively well by inspection of subsampled
data from Table 1, provided in the supplemental material.
However, in some cases these bias evaluation models mis-
classify content. For example, in the Ubuntu dataset “killing
a process” was classified as discriminatory, which we cor-
rected via a post-processing script. While these models are
suitable for initial characterization of the datasets, there is
much room for expansion in these bias evaluation models.
Word Embeddings Many neural conversational
systems use pre-trained word embeddings, such as
Word2Vec (Mikolov et al. 2013). These embeddings are
trained on general language datasets to pre-fit a language
model. These embeddings play a crucial role in shaping
the word distributions within encoder-decoder systems.
However, these embeddings present another source of
unintentional bias propagation. For example, in (Bolukbasi
et al. 2016) the authors demonstrate that gender bias is
encoded by Word2Vec embeddings and suggest ways to
debias them.
To this end, we perform another experiment to analyze the
effect of bias in word embeddings on dialogue and language
models. We use Word2Vec embeddings and the correspond-
ing debiased versions from (Bolukbasi et al. 2016) to train
two LSTM language models as in (Zaremba, Sutskever, and
Vinyals 2014) over Google one-billion words benchmark
dataset (Chelba et al. 2013). Extended descriptions of the
experimental setup and results can be found in the supple-
mental material. We use 50 stereotypically male-biased and
50 female-biased professions, defined in (Bolukbasi et al.
2016), as triggers and use the language models to complete
the utterances. For each trigger token, we extract 1000 sam-
ples from the stochastic language model. In these samples,
we calculate the co-occurrence of gender-specific words,
also defined in (Bolukbasi et al. 2016). We compare a subset
of the results among both the models in Table 2.
In local examinations, some triggers with stereo-typically
male-dominated occupations see significant shifts toward
even male-female follow-up distributions. For example, “the
evangelist”, a male stereotypical job, sees a followup dis-
tribution which is about 83% male (where gender-specific
terms exist), but decreases to 71% male with the debiased
word vectors. However, as seen in Table 2, the overall av-
erage followup distributions do not shift significantly, only
seeing a ∼ 1 − 2.5% overall change toward even distribu-
tions. Clearly, biases are encoded nonetheless by the lan-
guage model, necessitating further work in this area.
Recommendations and Future Investigations To prevent
the alienation of underrepresented societal groups and to re-
tain the public’s trust, it is vital for research and production
of conversational systems to avoid propagation of biases.
Through our demonstrative experiments we have shown that
many dialogue datasets are biased and contain potentially
offensive material which can be encoded and elicited by gen-
Dataset Bias Vader Sentiment FleschKincaid Hate Speech Offensive Language
Twitter 0.155 (± 0.380) 0.400 (± 0.597) 3.202 (± 3.449) 31,122 (0.63 %) 179,075 (3.63 %)
Reddit Politics 0.146 (± 0.38) -0.178 (± 0.69) 6.268 (± 2.256) 482,876 (2.38 %) 912,055 (4.50 %)
Cornell Movie Dialogue Corpus 0.162 (± 0.486) 0.087 (± 0.551) 2.045 (± 2.467) 2020 (0.66 %) 6,953 (2.28 %)
Ubuntu Dialogue Corpus 0.068 (± 0.323) 0.291 (± 0.582) 6.071 (± 3.994) 503∗ (0.01 %) 4,661 (0.13 %)
HRED Model Beam Search (Twitter) 0.09 (± 0.48) 0.21 (± 0.38) -2.08 (± 3.22) 38 (0.01 %) 1607 (0.21 %)
VHRED Model Beam Search (Twitter) 0.144 (± 0.549) 0.246 (± 0.352) 0.13 (± 31.9) 466 (0.06 %) 3010 (0.48%)
HRED Model Stochastic Sampling (Twitter) 0.20 (± 0.55) 0.20 (± 0.43) 1.40 (± 3.53) 4889 (0.65 %) 30,480 (4.06 %)
VHRED Model Stochastic Sampling (Twitter) 0.216 (± 0.568) 0.20 (± 0.41) 1.7 (±4.03) 3494 (0.47%) 26,981 (3.60 %)
Table 1: Results of detecting bias in dialogue datasets. ∗ Ubuntu results were manually filtered for hate speech as the classifier
incorrectly classified “killing” of processes as hate speech. Bias score (Hutto and Gilbert 2014) (0=UNBIASED to 3=EX-
TREMELY BIASED), Vader Sentiment (Hutto and Gilbert 2014) (compound scale from negative sentiment=-1 to positive
sentiment=1), FleschKincaid readability (Hutto and Gilbert 2014) (higher score means the sentence is harder to read), Hate
speech and offensive language (Davidson et al. 2017).
Word2vec Debiased
Distribution Male Female Male Female
Male Stereotypes 0.7545 0.2454 0.7437 0.2562
Female Stereotypes 0.7151 0.2848 0.6959 0.3040
Table 2: Percentage of gendered tokens in the follow-up dis-
tribution from a language model after trigger male/female
stereotypical profession is provided as a starting token.
We only examine following distributions which contained
gender-specific terms and omit gender-neutral distributions.
erative models such as HRED and VHRED. While current
methods, such as debiasing word vectors, have been shown
to slightly prevent the propagation of gender biases, further
effort is needed to extend such techniques to new domains.
This may come in the form of semi-automated data augmen-
tation to remove bias (perhaps using detection methods we
show here) or other methods which augment the training ob-
jective of conversational models.
In all cases, preventing bias from being encoded in mod-
ern dialogue systems requires explicit understanding of its
characteristics. The International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (The United Nations General Assembly 1966)
encodes that, “the law shall prohibit any discrimination
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status.” An algo-
rithmic notion of bias is needed which appropriately reflect
the notion we currently have for social and legal purposes.
Furthermore, it is vital to ensure that even subtle forms of
point-of-view biases are not encoded, as they can sway pub-
lic opinion in widely used dialogue settings. However, the
difficulty in doing so, while still providing coherent sys-
tems, may necessitate an intricate balance and deeper under-
standing of linguistic biases (Caliskan-Islam, Bryson, and
Narayanan 2016). To this end, a concerted effort should be
made to collect larger datasets and create more robust mod-
els of biased language in dialogue settings to better under-
stand its effects.
Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples are inputs to a machine learning
model – or perturbations of the input – designed to confuse
the model into inaccurate predictions. It is known that many
machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial ex-
amples (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014). The exis-
tence of adversarial examples has ethical and safety implica-
tions: even if dialogue systems are designed to produce safe
outputs under normal operating conditions, if these models
are vulnerable to adversarial inputs this could cause the sys-
tem to produce undesirable and unintended outputs.
Canonical literature in adversarial examples in machine
learning focuses primarily on image classification tasks. In
these cases, the images are perturbed in a way that is invisi-
ble to a human eye, but is enough to cause the model to mis-
classify images in a specific way (e.g. classify a cat as a dog).
The same definition may not generalize well to natural lan-
guage domains, where it is almost impossible to perturb the
data in a way that is not recognizable by humans due to the
discrete nature of the data. Recent work from (Jia and Liang
2017) proposes a notion of adversarial examples in the task
of machine reading comprehension, where the task is for the
system to process and answer questions about a document.
In this context, adversarial examples were created by adding
distracting sentences to the document text. The authors then
evaluated state-of-art Question and Answering (QA) mod-
els based on the adversarial accuracy of answers, and found
that the performance of all models significantly dropped.
However, defining adversarial examples in a strictly gen-
erative setting – where there is no accuracy or error mea-
sure to gauge the effect of adversarial examples – is still
an open problem. This problem is exacerbated in dialogue
settings. Evaluation is already a difficult task and using the
adversarial-induced log likelihood error in the context of di-
alogue may not account for similar semantic output distri-
butions. Instead, we investigate adversarial examples from a
linguistic perspective.
We consider two kinds of input noise for adversarial ex-
amples for end-to-end conversational models: (1) misspelled
words in dialogue systems, where we remove, replace or in-
sert an extra character in the sentence; (2) paraphrased sen-
tences, where different sentences having the same meaning
should invoke similar responses from the dialogue model,
Model Adversarial Type Adversarial Input Similarity Generated Response Similarity
Politics Character Edit (.94 ± .04 ; 2.99 ± .74 ; 4.56 ± .19) (0.75 ± .17 ; 2.38 ± 1.42 ; 3.30 ± 1.01)Paraphrased (.85 ± .13 ; 2.35 ± .65 ; 3.86 ± 0.84) (.77 ±.18 ; 2.52 ± 1.51 ; 3.39 ± .99)
Movies Character Edit (.93 ± .05 ; 2.88 ± .66 ; 4.52 ± 0.23) (.67 ± .19 ; 2.06 ± 1.11 ; 2.75 ± 1.07)Paraphrased (.84 ± .12 ; 2.68 ± .69 ; 3.97 ± .76) (0.64 ± .17 ; 1.87 ± .76 ; 2.61 ± .94)
Table 3: Semantic similarity between adversarial examples and base sentences and generated responses from base sentence
response. We report (cosine distance; LSTM similarity model (Mueller and Thyagarajan 2016); CNN similarity model (He,
Gimpel, and Lin 2015)) scores. Ratings are from 0-1, 1-5, and 1-5, respectively, from lesser to greater similarity.
but do not. The motivation for having misspelled words as
adversarial examples is similar to the motivation of the ad-
versarial examples for images. Humans are extremely robust
against misspellings in written language (Rawlinson 1976);
they can easily follow the context and meaning of sentences,
ignoring the adversarial noise in the data. A similar motiva-
tion can be held for paraphrased sentences.
For each model, 20 base example sentences are selected
as contexts. We generate 1000 character edits and 6 para-
phrased adversarial examples for each base sentence and
use each example as an input to the same VHRED retrieval
model (Serban et al. 2017b). The models are trained with the
same procedure as in (Serban et al. 2017b) on Reddit Movies
and Reddit Politics datasets. Details on this retrieval model
can be found in the supplemental material.
To determine the effect of the adversarial edits, we mea-
sure the change in semantic meaning triggered by the adver-
sarial example with respect to the base sentence response.
The semantic similarities are measured by word embedding
cosine distance, LSTM similarity model (Mueller and Thya-
garajan 2016) and CNN similarity models (He, Gimpel, and
Lin 2015). As shown in Table 3, paraphrasing and mis-
spellings of a single character can cause significant changes
in semantic meaning and output distributions, though the ad-
versarial examples themselves are more similar to the base
input. A small number of qualitative examples of this phe-
nomenon can be seen in Table 4 with more examples in the
supplemental material.
Character-Level Edit Adversarial Example
CONTEXT: Inside Out is really funny
RESPONSE: i could not stop laughing during the first
one. I honestly found it to be hilarious.
CONTEXT: Insde Out is really funny
RESPONSE: i didn’t really find it funny. it just surprised
me. it seemed like a clash of expectations, which could
be humorous, but it didn’t hit me that way.
Paraphrased Adversarial Examples
CONTEXT: Did you like Mad Max the movie?
RESPONSE: it’s okay and very decent. the first half is
great but I don’t really like what happens after that.
CONTEXT: How did you find Max Mad the movie?
RESPONSE: easily in my top favorite films of all time. I
thought it was an accurate depiction of a mother learning
that her son is a sociopath. great acting all around.
Table 4: Adversarial samples from VHRED dialogue model
trained on Reddit Movies. For each, top is the base context
and response, and bottom is the adversarial sample.
Recommendations and Future Investigations We have
explored two different notions of adversarial examples in
dialogue systems, and our preliminary analysis shows that
current neural dialogue language generation systems can be
susceptible to adversarial examples. However, further work
is needed to formalize and investigate adversarial examples
in generative settings – particularly for natural language and
dialogue. Several interesting avenues are possible for de-
veloping dialogue systems that are robust to adversity, in-
cluding incorporating generated adversarial examples dur-
ing training using data augmentation.
Privacy
With virtual assistants taking the form of “always on” de-
vices in the home, privacy and security is of tantamount con-
cern. While network-based attack vectors have been investi-
gated in home-based personal assistant devices (Apthorpe et
al. 2017), the language and dialogue models of these devices
pose another attack vector, raising privacy concerns.
It has been shown that model-inversion attacks can be
used to compromise the privacy of training data through in-
formation leakage in machine learning models (Song, Ris-
tenpart, and Shmatikov 2017). With conversational models
susceptible to such vulnerabilities being integrated into in-
home devices, the threat of model exploitation can grow.
Let us consider the case of accidental information leakage
in such a system. For example, the dialogue agent acciden-
tally records a user revealing private information during a
conversation (e.g. “Computer, turn on the lights – answers
the phone – Hi, yes, my password is...”). If this informa-
tion is then to used train a conversational model, an attacker
can attempt to elicit sensitive information by exploiting the
encoder-decoder nature of a dialogue system.
To illustrate this, we formulate an experiment. We sub-
sample the Ubuntu dialogue corpus (Lowe et al. 2015) for
10k dialogue pairs and augment the data with 10 input-
output pairs (keypairs) that represent sensitive data, which
the model should keep secret. We train a simple seq2seq di-
alogue model (Vinyals and Le 2015) on the data and measure
the accuracy of eliciting the secret information over number
of epochs. We test three different types of keypair sequences
(5 word sequences for both the key and the value): (1) unique
keypairs that do not exist in any vocabulary (UUID), (2)
words from the English natural language vocabulary (NL),
and (3) words sub-sampled from the 10k dialogue pairs. As
seen in Figure 1, the model learns to elicit the private in-
formation simply by inputting the triggering information se-
quence (key) with nearly 100% accuracy. Of course, in the
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Figure 1: Privacy Experiment. Accuracy of elicited secret
value given the key to a seq2seq model over training epochs.
case where the private keypair information is sub-sampled
from the corpus, the information is less statistically signifi-
cant and more difficult to elicit. We expect this result gener-
alizes to different datasets and encoder-decoder models due
to the fact that such models try to produce statistically rel-
evant outputs – which inherently may encode private infor-
mation if the encoding context is unique enough. More in-
formation on the experiments and key-pair samples are pro-
vided in the supplemental material.
Recommendations and Future Investigations Overall, we
demonstrate in a small setting that models that are not prop-
erly generalized, or that are trained on improperly filtered
data, can reveal private information through simple elicita-
tion, even if the sensitive information comprises < 0.1%
of the data. Current dialogue models that use natural lan-
guage generation should be particularly aware of privacy
leakage from underlying datasets, especially where data is
acquired in a sensitive fashion (e.g. in-home devices). Fu-
ture lines of investigation may find the integration of au-
tomated anonymization (Ororbia et al. 2016) and differen-
tial privacy (Abadi et al. 2016) beneficial for conversational
models. Exploring privacy-aware dialogue models is a pre-
requisite for shared learning models that generate natural
language and that are deployed in production settings.
Safety
To examine safety in the context of dialogue systems, we
adopt the perspective of (Amodei et al. 2016) and focus on
the problem of accidents, defined as unintended or harm-
ful behaviour resulting from poor design. However, defining
safe behaviours in dialogue can be challenging and the def-
inition may change depending on the application context.
Here, we generally define a safe behaviour as one that an
agent takes, which does not cause any offensive or harm-
ful effects to human interlocutors. In chatbots, this could
mean restricting the action space such that the agent does
not output offensive or discriminatory content. Using this
definition, we examine three risks as our primary foci for
safety in dialogue: (1) providing learning performance guar-
antees; (2) proper objective specification; (3) model inter-
pretability (Amodei et al. 2016; Garcıa and Ferna´ndez 2015;
Doshi-Velez and Kim 2017). Furthermore, to understand
why these aspects of AI safety are relevant to dialogue sys-
tems, we examine highly sensitive and safety-critical set-
tings where dialogue agents have begun being used. We
define three main areas of concern where consideration of
dialogue system safety and the aforementioned lines of in-
vestigation are required: health; mental and emotional well-
being; lack of contextual awareness.
Model Safety Considerations In systems that generate
natural language, stability and coherent output is particu-
larly difficult to achieve, often requiring complex curriculum
learning schedules (Li et al. 2016). Without performance
guarantees, model divergence may result in undesirable be-
haviour which does not meet the bar for a dialogue system
usage in a critical setting. To achieve stable learning and
further guarantee safety, a proper objective function must
be specified. In task-oriented dialogue systems, where the
goal of the system is to solve some task for the user, an ob-
jective can be easily formulated (e.g. executing the desired
behaviour in the least amount of turns). Yet in agents with
general user engagement, proper specification of an objec-
tive function can be difficult (Liu et al. 2016). Restrictive
and highly specified objective functions must be established
to constrain agents to safe behaviours. Lastly, if a dialogue
agent exhibits unsafe behaviours, it is important to be able
to interpret why it chose to say or do something. For exam-
ple, to address and prevent the exhibition of discriminatory
language, we must understand why the agent exhibited this
behaviour and provide a mechanism for human intervention.
Areas of Safety Concern Medical domains where chatbots
have the potential to be used as diagnostic tools are a clear
safety concern with dialogue systems. Already, the use of
such conversational models has been investigated for diag-
nosing and managing diabetes, such as in (Lokman et al.
2009). As these dialogue systems move from merely human-
assistive towards more autonomous roles, we must have con-
versational model performance guarantees in place to en-
sure systems are both giving accurate medical advice which
doesn’t put the health of the user in jeopardy and provid-
ing feedback in an appropriate way (e.g. when providing a
diagnosis, a good bedside manner is needed).
Similarly, impact on the mental and emotional well-being
of users is a potential safety risk for dialogue agents. It is
important for the system to be aware of, and responsive to,
the emotional state of the user. For example, if a dialogue
agent knows that a user is depressed, it is perhaps safer to
avoid mentioning or inquiring about topics that can worsen
their mental condition. While this pertains generally to con-
versational agents, it is especially relevant for systems ex-
plicitly used to support mental health, such as Woebot (Fitz-
patrick, Darcy, and Vierhile 2017), where potentially vulner-
able populations rely on the agent for support.
Finally, the idea of contextual safety – that is, in the cur-
rent environment state, could a dialogue agent harm the
user by interacting with them in a certain way. In-vehicle
dialog systems are a perfect case study for this. In addi-
tion to the challenges faced by general-purpose dialog sys-
tems, in-vehicle dialog systems face additional concerns re-
garding the added variables of the driver and the environ-
ment (Weng et al. 2016). As the focus and safety of the driver
is paramount, dialog systems must be cognizant of what in-
formation it surfaces; it should not inform a driver to take
a “sharp left” while moving at a certain speed, or play loud
sounds that could startle a driver. Such contextual concerns
are relevant to any dialogue system used in the wild, and is
especially difficult to judge without risk assessment.
Recommendations and Future Investigations As dia-
logue agents become more seamlessly integrated into ev-
eryday life – in cars, portable devices, and home environ-
ments – safety concerns regarding physical health, mental
well-being, and contextual safety can have life-threatening
repercussions. In all these scenarios, a dialogue agent must
identify the safety concerns in the given setting, recognize
when an interlocutor is in a vulnerable position, monitor
their condition, and act accordingly. This involves a complex
interplay of systems, where performance guarantees, proper
objective specification, and model interpretability can be dif-
ficult. Nonetheless, these are a requirement for deployment
of dialogue systems in live settings.
Absolute guarantees on safety will most likely be imprac-
tical or impossible to produce, as it would require a com-
plete understanding of the definition of safety in dialogue.
However, it should be possible to produce conditional safety
guarantees given a model trained to predict biased or unsafe
behaviour in a dialogue system. In this case, one could put
an upper bound on the probability that a dialogue system
generates an unsafe response with respect to the model. To
this end, further investigation of the aforementioned topics
is needed in the context of dialogue agents: (1) risk identi-
fication and model-based assessment; (2) performance and
safety guarantees in models; (3) interpretability, interrupt-
ability, and human intervention. In systems that can learn in
real-time – as in reinforcement learning (RL) – these consid-
erations become more complex as model performance may
not be assessed and validated in an offline fashion.
Reinforcement Learning (RL)
As RL becomes more commonplace in dialogue systems (Li
et al. 2016; Serban et al. 2017b), special considerations are
needed for such agents according to the previous discussions
in safety. Since RL agents learn from interaction with their
environment, performance guarantees and objective formu-
lation have slightly different concerns. Performance guaran-
tees in this context comprise the field of safe RL (Garcıa and
Ferna´ndez 2015). The main aspects of safe RL include mod-
ification of the optimality criterion with a safety factor or the
exploration process with extrinsic information or a risk anal-
ysis metric. The latter is a concern unique to RL since agents
balance exploration and exploitation during the learning pro-
cess. Due to the sensitive nature of some contexts, placing
guarantees on the exploratory space – either through theo-
retical guarantees on the added exploration policy or through
structural restriction on the exploration space – is extremely
important. If the agent uses exploratory behaviours in a live
setting, this could be fatal (e.g. as in the critical settings dis-
cussed previously). Similarly, formulation of a proper objec-
tive in RL correlates to: generating a reward function which
discourages and places bounds on unsafe behaviour; restrict-
ing the policy to actions and states which guarantee privacy,
safety, and lack of bias. As with any optimization function,
improper specification of a reward function or policy space
can be catastrophic, especially in agents that learn in real
time as they interact with users (Neff and Nagy 2016). How-
ever, evaluation of dialogue is still unsolved and identifica-
tion of safety risks can involve separate complex mecha-
nisms. As such, further investigation is needed to both un-
derstand dialogue safety and evaluation in order to place
such guarantees on RL policies, reward functions, and ob-
jective formulations.
Reproducibility
Special consideration must also be placed on the repro-
ducibility of dialogue systems research. Modern training of
complex dialogue systems often requires specialized train-
ing schedules (Li et al. 2016) that are difficult to repli-
cate. Investigations of reproducibility in dialogue systems
research can and should comprise singular works, akin
to (Henderson et al. 2017). Here, we simply emphasize that,
to ensure ethical dialogue system research practices, it is
paramount to release code, pre-trained models, and intricate
details used to train data-driven models. Since evaluation of
dialogue is an open problem, supplementary qualitative eval-
uation through interaction with the model may be necessary
for insights into true performance, yet this is only possible
if the model and detailed procedures are released. Without
this it is easy to provide unfair comparisons through cherry-
picked evaluations. Overall, further effort is needed to find
reproducible, ethical, and fair evaluation methodologies.
Discussion
Here, this paper highlights several aspects of safety and
ethics in developing dialogue systems: bias, adversarial ex-
amples, privacy, safety, considerations for RL, and repro-
ducibility. We give demonstrative examples of ethical or
safety issues in these contexts and provide recommendations
based on literary and experimental findings for each direc-
tion of ethics and safety in conversational models. Our goal
is to spur discussion and lines of technical data-driven dia-
logue systems research, including: battling underlying bias
and adversarial examples; ensuring privacy, safety, and re-
producibility. We hope that dialogue systems of the future
can place guarantees to make obsolete the issues we discuss
here, and ensure ethical and safe human-like interfaces.
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